Public choice and public law

edited by Daniel A. Farber

Public choice theory has become an increasingly significant aspect of public law scholarship. A more comprehensive knowledge of public institutions and their activities can illuminate our understanding of how legal rules shape the behavior of these institutions. This volume gathers together key papers highlighting the fundamental issues in the evolution of this subject. Besides providing an appreciation of the institutional complexity and potential weak points of democracies, public choice theory promises to show how political structures and processes shape outcomes for better or for worse. It thereby aids understanding and improvements to institutional design. Much of that design is expressed in the form of law, so the subject is of particular importance to legal scholars. This authoritative selection of articles provides a firm foundation to this important area of study.

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[目次]

  • Contents: Acknowledgements Introduction Daniel A. Farber PART I INTEREST GROUP THEORIES 1. George J. Stigler (1971), 'The Theory of Economic Regulation' 2. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1975), 'The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective' 3. Einer R. Elhauge (1991), 'Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?' PART II INSTITUTIONALIST AND AGENCY THEORIES 4. Tom Ginsburg (2002), 'Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and Theory in Legal Scholarship' 5. Keith Krehbiel (2004), 'Legislative Organization' 6. Daryl J. Levinson (2005), 'Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law' PART III PUBLIC CHOICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7. Jerry L. Mashaw (1985), 'Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions' 8. McNollgast (1999), 'The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act' 9. Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell (1999), 'The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action' PART IV PUBLIC CHOICE AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 10. Frank H. Easterbrook (1983), 'Statutes' Domains' 11. William N. Eskridge, Jr. (1988), 'Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation' 12. Kenneth A. Shepsle (1992), 'Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron' 13. McNollgast (1994), 'Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation' Name Index

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この本の情報

書名 Public choice and public law
著作者等 Farber, Daniel A
シリーズ名 An Elgar reference collection
Economic approaches to law
出版元 Edward Elgar
刊行年月 c2007
版表示 illustrated ed
ページ数 xvii, 486 p.
大きさ 26 cm
ISBN 9781845427160
NCID BA82421638
※クリックでCiNii Booksを表示
言語 英語
出版国 イギリス
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